





Addressing issues and challenges in managing migratory tuna resources in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean  
 
 
Tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean are the world’s largest and most 
valuable fisheries of their type and are vital to the economy and the sustainable development 
of the region. However, the region witnesses a rapid decline in tuna resources and the depletion 
of species such as bigeye and yellowfin tunas and overharvesting of the other species. This 
study investigated the collaborative management model used to manage migratory tuna 
resources. The study followed a case study design with a focus on the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean Fisheries Commission. Forty interviews were conducted with key stakeholders. 
The findings indicated that six factors, namely, structure and size, self-interest, self-
enforcement, leadership style, equality of power and culture, impacted significantly the 
outcomes of a collaborative management model. The findings also provide important insights 
on how the factors influenced the outcomes. The study contributes to a better understanding of 
international governance of common-pool resources (CPRs) and its challenges, and thus helps 
policy makers develop strategies for managing migratory fishing resources for the sake of the 
economic viability and sustainability in the region. 
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Tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) are the world’s largest and 
most valuable fisheries of their type and are vital to the economy and the sustainable 
development of the region. Compared to other ocean regions, the WCPO supplied more than 
50 percent of the tuna resources to the global markets (World Bank, 2016) which are worth an 
estimated US$5.3 billion each year (Seto & Hanich, 2018). However, tuna resources have been 
declining rapidly (e.g. Cyranoski, 2010; Costello et al. 2016; Hino et al., 2019). A combination 
of several factors has attributed to the decline. They include increased vessels’ capacities, the 
high rate of illegally, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities and government 
fisheries subsidies (Havice, 2013; Sumaila, et al., 2014; WCPFC, 2016a). Additionally, fishing 
in closed areas, violations of fishing licence rules, illegal discards (dumping untargeted species 
overboard), and misreporting of catch have resulted in plundering of the fisheries and loss of 
revenue for the Pacific Island countriesi (PICs), according to the Marine Resources Assessment 
Group’s (MRAG) Report (MRAG 2016).  
Governments, policy advocates, researchers, and other stakeholders have been searching for 
effective solutions to the problems associated with managing tuna resources (Havice & 
Campling, 2010; Mapuru & Naz, 2013; Wakamatsu & Managi, 2019; Pilling et al., 2020). In 
the WCPOii, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established 
based on the principles of collaborative management (CM). The key principals include 
partnership, cooperation, participation, shared interests, collective responsibilities, mutual 
trust, social capital and consensus-based decisions (Doulman, 1993; Marttunen & Hämäläinen, 
2008). The collaborative management and governance arrangement of the WCPFC involves 
26 member states, cooperating non-members, participating territories and stakeholders such as 
non-government organizations (NGOs), fishing industries and distant water fishing nations 
(DWFNs), making it a complex management structure and institution. While collaborative 
management may work well with the management of some of traditional coastal fisheries in 
the Pacific Islands, known as community-based fisheries management (Cohen et al. 2015), the 
effectiveness of the model in managing highly migratory tuna resources involving regional 
and international actors remains unclear (Hanich & Tsamenyi 2014; Norris 2015).  
Therefore, this research seeks to address the knowledge gap by investigating the use of CM 
as a tool to tackle issues surrounding the management of migratory tuna resources. The study 
was anchored on cooperative game theory to understand and explain the issues. In essence, the 
cooperative game theory describes players (actors) competing in grand coalitions rather than 
as individuals. The theory seeks to attain fairness and collective benefits (payoffs) for all 
players by way of regular communications in managing conflicting situations (Ostrom, 1990). 
The research takes the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) as a 
case study for two reasons. First, the management of migratory tuna involves inter-country and 
different sovereign states. It also involves different actors with different level of powers (e.g. 
coastal states and DWFNs) that are subject to different sovereign laws and national interests. 
However, international governance of CPRs has been understudied, though fisheries are often 
used for CPR studies. Second, the WCPO region has the world’s largest tuna resources. They 
are vital to the livelihood of small Pacific Island countries (PICs). However, research about 
issues of managing migratory tuna in the Pacific region has been underexplored, based on our 
literature review.   
Specifically, this study aims to understand what factors and how the factors impact the 
collaborative management and governance arrangements of the WCPFC in managing 
migratory tuna resources. The findings of the study will help policy makers, in particular, in 
the WCPO region develop strategies to address issues and challenges identified in this study 






2. Literature review 
 
As the study is on the collaborative management and governance arrangements of the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), this literature review centres around the 
management of common-pool resources (CPRs) to make it most relevant and manageable to 
this study. The primary criteria for our selection of the literature are that the publication outlets 
must be reputable, and the publications for the review have already generated academic impact 
judging by their impact factors (IFs). As a result, most of the articles reviewed were published 
in the mainstream leading scholarly journals between 2000-2015 and recorded a significant 
number of citations (20+ IFs) at the time of this review conducted between 2015 and 2016. 
However, other journal articles published three to five decades ago were also reviewed. These 
articles and authors were cited as references in many of the more recent articles on the topic 
areas, such as the works written by Ostrom, Axelrod, and Nash. The major database used to 
search the articles included Pro-Quest, EbscoHost, Emerald, AQORA and JSTOR. The key 
search words were selected based on their relevance and importance to this study, including 
management of CPRs, collaborative management, co-management, collective action, and 
community-based fisheries management (CBFM). The search and review was limited to 
management and governance perspective, and did not include articles that focused primarily 
on law, marine science, production and business strategy of fishing firms, technical aspects, 
etc. As a result, a total of 68 publications were selected for this review. Table 1 presents a brief 
summary of the basic features of the publications.  
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study 






















1970s 1   Ethnographic 12 Europe 12 Agriculture 1 
1960s 1   Experimental 8 Asia 11 Unspecified 27 
1950s 1   Conceptual 22 Africa 6   
      Pacific 4   
*Note: Common-pool resources (CPRs):  natural resources refers to forests, wildlife, ponds, rivers, and 
minerals; fisheries inshore refers to coastal fisheries; fisheries offshore refers to fish in the deep ocean far from 
the coast (mostly pelagic, or migratory species); and agriculture refers to irrigation systems and pastures.  
 
This endeavour reveals that the majority of the articles with a primary focus on governance 
and management of CPRs originated from North America (33), Europe (12) and Asia (11). 
Only four of the articles tackle the management and governance issues in the Pacific region. 
We argue that the context of studies plays an important role in commons management. Factors 
such as beliefs, attitude, socio-cultural, economics, and political environments can influence 
how societies (or communities) behave and interpret their situations (Podsakoff et al., 2012). 
In this regard, more research from the mainstream literature is needed on government and 







2.1. Collaborative management  
Collaborative management (CM) is a loosely defined term. In a general sense, collaborative 
management is a working practice whereby individuals work together for a common goal 
(Ansell & Gash, 2007). Scholars such as Heikkila (2005) and Berkes et al. (2009) refer to it as 
‘co-management’, which is defined as ‘a group of stakeholders, including resource users and 
government agencies working together to resolve shared dilemma’ (Berkes et al., 2009 p.583). 
Additionally, McGuire (2006), defined CM as a ‘concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements for solving problems that 
cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations’ (p.576). The principles of CM, 
based on Colebatch & Larmour’s (1993) definition are ‘common beliefs and values, affiliation 
and network’ (p.23), where members behave according to their group’s norms and take 
collective actions to achieve their goals.  
The key concept of collaborative management (CM) was drawn largely from cooperative 
game theory. The theory argues that people tend to be controlled by group rationality when 
they can interact, communicate and work as a group (Nash, 1950). The group rationality 
prompts participants to be aware of other members’ goals, needs and challenges, therefore 
enabling them to cooperate among themselves (Ostrom, 1999). In the context of commons 
management, CM is sometimes referred to as ‘joint management’ which is an arrangement of 
power sharing between the State and local communities of CPRs (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).  
Most of the literature (42 out of 68 articles) that we reviewed has considered that CM is 
effective in improving the efficiency and equity in managing CPRs (e.g. Mutimukru 2010; 
Boateng, 2006). However, researchers such as Agrawal (2003), and Grafton et al. (2006) have 
reported negative outcomes in terms of cooperation towards the sustainability of CPRs. Despite 
the negative outcomes, most researchers are optimistic that the weaknesses can be addressed 
and have suggested ways for improvements.  
Prior studies posit that CM has both perceived benefits (e.g. Heikkila & Gerlak 2005; Berkes 
2009) and realized benefits (e.g. Cheng & Sturtvant 2012) in the management of CPRs. The 
key benefits for CM may include sharing common goals (Sa-Ngiamlak et al. 2011), social 
learning (Marttunen & Hämäläinen 2008; Richie et al. 2012), better relationships (Bruckmeier 
& Larsen 2008; Caldwell et al. 2009), and participatory decision making. Other benefits 
reported are: integrated management which enhances unity by bringing together different 
groups under a single framework (Olaru et al., 2014, Muñoz-Erickson et al., 2010), mutual 
respect (Richie et al., 2012) and collective benefits of all stakeholders (Espinoza-Tenorio et al., 
2012).  
 
2.2. Factors influencing collaborative management outcomes 
Prior studies have identified many factors and conditions that are conducive to effective 
management of CPRs. These include: (i) equal power distribution among members (e.g. 
Gallardo et al. 2013), (ii) strong common interest (e.g. Acheson 2013), (iii) certain cultural 
orientations (predominantly communalism, femininity and long-term orientations) (e.g. Jentoft 
& Chuenpagdee, 2009), (iv) fair endowment (e.g. Ostrom, 1999), (v) high-level of cooperation 
(McGuire, 2006), (vi) strong leadership style (e.g. Cheng & Sturtevant 2012), (vii) low to 
moderate transaction costs (e.g. Dyer 1997), (viii) incentives (e.g. Hanich et al. 2015), (vix) 
clarity of rules (e.g. Xepapadeas, 2005), (x) small size groups (e.g. Olson 2009), and (xi) self-
enforcement compounded with external enforcement (e.g. Reaves & Bauer, 2012). However, 
as Reynard et al. (2002) and Masomera (2002) argued that the effective management and 
governance structure and model of CPRs are context-based.  
Among the 68 articles that we reviewed, only four of them (e.g. Chand et al., 2003; Havice 





fisheries management in the WCPO. For example, the study by Havice and Campling (2010) 
argues from a political economy perspective that the combination of competitive capital 
accumulation strategies and inter-state power relations is the main factor in explaining the 
challenges in the WCPO tuna sector. The study by Bailey et al. (2013) addresses the overfishing 
issue in the WCPO through developing a bioeconomic game-theoretic equilibrium model. The 
model suggests that the elimination of fishing on floating objects could result in increased net 
benefits. But the potential economic gains require the formation of a cooperative sharing 
system. The limited research on the dynamics of international governance of CPRs makes this 
research important as it enhances the understanding of not only what factors but also how the 
factors influence collaborative management and governance in migratory tuna resources in the 




3.1. Research design 
A case study approach was chosen for this study because the method is useful when in-depth 
explanations of social behaviour are sought (Zainal, 2007) and when examination of data is 
conducted within the context of its use (Yin, 1994). The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC) was selected as a case institution and a unit of analysis, because it took 
a collaborative governance model in managing CPRs at both regional and international levels. 
The data collection for the case study was conducted mainly through interviews complemented 
with documentary research of WCPFC official documents.  
The WCPFC was founded to operate under a legally binding framework and the principles 
of collaborative governance that was based on collective responsibility and collective benefits 
(WCPFC, 2013). The mission of the WCPFC is the effective management and conservation of 
highly migratory stocks for sustainable use. Its member states include mostly the Pacific 
Islands Forum members (PIFs) including Australia, New Zealand and 14 Pacific Island 
countries (PICs), and distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) including Canada, USA, EU, 





We conducted semi-structured interviews, which provided consistency of questioning across 
interviews while having the flexibility to explore areas of interest in greater depth. The 
interviews were completed over a four-month period between May and October 2015 in three 
locations – Nadi, Fiji; Pohnpei, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM); and Honiara, the 
Solomon Islands. The time and places were chosen because the places hosted WCPFC 
committee meetings between May and October, which drew the targeted informants for this 
study. The main meetings were the Regular Scientific Committee meeting, Technical 
Compliance Committee meeting and the annual WCPFC member meeting.  
Offshore tuna fisheries in the WCPFC is a sensitive issue, with government representatives 
from member states being hesitant to reveal information about their governments’ position or 
their opinions. Research suggests that using face-to-face interviews offers the opportunity to 
break down the barrier, because on most occasions, discussions begin on the surface of the 
subject and then develop further into the core of the issue once trust is developed (Holbrook et 
al., 2003). Therefore, we considered that face-to-face interviews would be an optimal choice 
for this study. The interviews were intended to collect participants’ insights into the CM 





conservation and management measures (CMMs) and sustainable use of migratory tuna 
resources to achieve conservation goals, as well as the factors influencing the outcomes. 
Therefore, our interview questions revolved broadly around the following two key questions:  
1. What is your view on the current collaborative management and governance 
arrangements of the WCPFC in terms of achieving the mission of the WCPFC?  
2. What do you think are the most important factors influencing the outcomes of the 
collaborative management and governance of the WCPFC? 
The key factors identified from our literature review (section 2.2 in this paper) were used to 
guide the interview discussion in relation to question 2. The interviews took between 30 
minutes to 1 hour depending on the time availability of the participants. All the interviews were 





We selected potential participants for our interviews following a purposive sampling technique, 
targeting key senior fishery officials from the 26 member states of the WCPFC. Most of them 
held important responsibilities in the fishing industry of their countries at the time of the 
interviews. They were representative of various stakeholders such as governments, resource 
users (fishing companies), monitoring, control and surveillance officers (see Table 2 for 
detail). They were usually the gatekeepers holding most of the information about the 
management of tuna fisheries. To gain comprehensive insight into the WCPFC’s governance 
issues, we also recruited people who were marine scientists and university lecturers, and 
officials of NGOs for interviews. As a result, a total of 40 key informants participated in our 
interviews. Table 2 presents a summary of the demographic data on the participants. Among 
them, 28 from PICs, 7 from DWFNs, 2 from NGOs, and 3 from RFMOs. The discrepancy in 
the number of members that we interviewed between the PICs and DWFNs was due to the 
unavailability of many of DWFNs who declined our interview, citing their tight schedules 
during and after the meetings of the WCPFC as the reason. All participants requested 
anonymity prior to the interviews. For confidentiality reasons, we are unable to provide further 
demographic data about the participants than those shown in Table 2. 





Job Position  
PICs   
 
20 Senior Government Official of Offshore 
Fisheries 
6 Senior Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance Officer 
2 University Academics (Fisheries 
Lecturer) 
DWFNs 2 Tuna Scientist 
3 Tuna Industry Manager  
2 Senior Government Official of Fisheries 
NGOs 2 Conservation Manager 
RFMOs 1 Tuna Fishery Adviser 
2 Tuna Business Manager  







3.4. Data analysis 
 
We used NVivo 11 software to help analyse our interview data by classifying, sorting and 
arranging information into their respective themes. It also helped us with concept mapping to 
examine the relationship between concepts. We chose content analysis (Neuendorf, 2016) to 
identify and categorise themes that centred around our two main interview questions, namely, 
what factors and how they influence the outcomes of the WCPFC. The following section 
presents the detail of the findings.  
 
4. Findings and discussion 
We found a general sentiment among the participants that the WCPFC management and 
governance model was not effective in curbing overharvesting and illegally unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) activities in the region. We sought to pinpoint the root causes of the problem 
and identify key issues in managing migratory tune resources in the region. In this regard, we 
engaged collaborative management (CM) discourse. As shown in our literature review section, 
prior studies have identified eleven factors that may influence the outcomes of CM, including 
equality of power, self-interest, cooperation, endowment, cultural diversity, leadership style, 
transaction costs, incentives, clarity of rules, size of the group, and enforcement. Our data 
analysis resulted in six of them that were seen by the participants as most prominent in 
influencing CM outcomes according to the number of participants who shared the same view. 
These included structure and size of the WCPFC, competing interests, difficulty with self-
enforcement, leadership style, power inequality and different powers among WCPFC member 
states, and cultural differences. Table 3 presents a summary of the responses from WCPFC’s 
different type of member groups (see Table 2) to the six factors. The following sections discuss 
each of them briefly in the sequence of prominence viewed by the participants. 
 
Table 3 Summary of responses to most prominent factors in influencing CM outcomes 





















PIC 25 20 17 20 17 16 
DWFN 3 5 6 2 3 2 
NGO 2 2 2 2 2 1 
RFMO 2 3 3 3 2 1 
Total 32 30 28 27 24 20 
 
4.1. Structure and size of the WCPFC 
 
There was a clear consensus among our participants (32 out of 40) that the current structure 
and size of the WCPFC, a large and heterogeneous group representing various stakeholders in 
multi-jurisdictional regions, made it difficult for members to agree on critical issues such as 
conservation and management measures (CMMs), resulting in its inability to achieve 
WCPFC’s conservation goals. For examples: 
 ...as members get bigger, it gets complicated and the interests get wider, and some of 
these interests are finding their way to this WCPFC, the size as it is now making it more 
complicated than it was initially set-up.  
 
Well in terms of group dynamics [in the WCPFC], bigger groups are very hard to 





group that would be hard to make decisions, the smaller possibly manageable would 
be good, we can identify who are the key stakeholders in the fisheries would be good 
because they play a major role in the fisheries. 
 
Prior studies have different conclusions about structure factors such as composition and size 
of coalitions and their effects on institutional arrangements, and therefore, on the outcomes of 
CM. The study by Schlager (2004) suggests that heterogeneity and size of group do not have a 
significant impact on the likelihood of collective action. However, researchers such as Olson 
(2009) argues that size of group affects the outcomes of collective action and the larger the 
group, the less likely the common interests can be sustained. Studies suggest that CM is more 
likely to be effective in groups that are homogeneous and in the same geographic region, 
because members can more readily establish collective behaviours (group rationality). For 
example, the studies by Doulman (1993) and Johannes (2002) conclude that community 
fisheries management arrangements work effectively in most communities of the Pacific (e.g. 
Kiribati). Our findings contributed to the debate and shed further light on how the structure 
factors and size of group impacted on the decision-making process as well as the outcomes of 
CM.  
 
4.2. Competing interests 
 
In our interviews, a strong sentiment expressed by the participants (30 out of 40 participants) 
regardless of the type of their membership, was self-interest. We found that it was the 
precedence of self-interest over conservation goals that attributed to the failure of WCPFC in 
reaching agreements and delivering results, although all the member states appreciated the 
importance of common interest (i.e. conservation and sustainability of tuna fisheries). Two 
participants put it this way: 
The work of the WCPFC is extremely difficult because of the divergent interests among 
the members. This makes negotiations very difficult. 
 
Well, when conservation and management measures are not agreed or when there is 
no decision on the issues, this certainly means there is a difference in interest…I think 
from a DWFNs perspective, they will continue fishing, continue having their businesses 
alive, but from a coastal state’s [i.e. PICs’) perspective it’s a matter of sustaining that 
resource to ensure that there is a maximum economic return, so whether it be excess 
fees or what so ever value added. Therefore, I would say perhaps the common goal 
would be to have sustainable fishery, there would be differences on what would be the 
economic returns, what it means to those different perspectives.  
Research shows that self-interest is a common issue in the management of CPRs because 
individual rationality often leads to a social dilemma situation (Ostrom, 1999; Salmi & Muje, 
2001). In the case of the WCPFC, we found that DWFNs sought to maximize their financial 
benefits from the tuna resources, while PICs felt that they did not receive their fair share and 
were proposing an increase in the resource rent, which did not go down well with the DWFNs. 
One of the participants told us ‘almost four billion dollars’ worth of fish was harvested in 
Pacific waters in 2013, but not even a quarter of that value was returned to the region (the 
PICs)’.  
To our observation from interviews, DWFNs viewed the Conservation and Management 
Measure on Regulation of Transhipment (WCPFC, 2009) as a significant economic hardship 
to their long line fishing vessels. This was because they must go to PIC ports to offload their 
catch which incurred many fees, rather than transhipping their catch at their fishing ground. As 





of PICs generated economic spill-over benefits for PICs such as bunkering, taxes, port fees and 
other charges. Thus, the main hurdle to achieving CMMs was the competing interests and the 
unequal share of benefits received from the tuna resources among the WCPFC member states. 
This finding was consistent with the study of Aqorau (2018) and Hanich et al (2015) on the 
problems of conservation management of the tuna resources in the region. 
The cooperative game theory suggests that collaborative management works when the 
benefits of a common approach for the good of the group (i.e. all countries in the WCPFC) is 
enough motivation for all to comply. However, this is not the case in the WCPFC with very 
different interests at stake, where the group rationality was overrun by the individual rationality 
of the member states. As a result of competing interests, the continued overharvesting of tuna 




Our interviews found that most participants (28 out of 40) believed based on their past 
experiences with the WCPFC that self-enforcement was not a viable mechanism to manage 
migratory tuna resources. Here are two comments made by the participants:  
…it is and will be difficult for the DWFNs to participate co-productively in this approach [self-
enforcement] because they have different interests. They are more interested in making money. 
So, we still need observers to oversee their activities and to increase the capacities of external 
monitoring and surveillance. 
 
When we talk about offshore resources, we refer to migratory species that trans- 
boundaries, it is very difficult [to apply self-enforcement] because they are highly 
migratory. The key to managing such resources is monitoring and surveillance, if 
people feel that they own the resources or part of them.  
 
Some of the extant research suggests that self-enforcement (where fishers are responsible to 
monitor their own behaviour) helps in the effective management of commons (Reaves & Bauer, 
2012), when resource users have rights to commons (Oviedo & Burszty, 2016). However, due 
to the differences in the perception of the ownership of tuna resources, self-enforcement was 
proved to be difficult to implement in the WCPFC. This is because PICs have a strong interest 
in the long-term sustainability of tuna fisheries for their future generations, whereas DWFNs 
often have short-term licensed rights, which may not be guaranteed in the future. Therefore, 
long-term strategies are needed for self-enforcement to work for all in commercial fisheries 
and particularly in migratory tuna management, as well as in a heterogeneous coalition where 
members have divergent and competing interests. Some research suggests that self-
enforcement must be compounded with external interventions such as regulations and 
monitoring by external authorities in order to achieve the desired results (Van Laerhoven & 
Barnes, 2014). Our finding may help explain further the challenges facing WCFPC’s self-
enforcement in managing highly migratory tuna resources that are multi-jurisdictional and 
cross-regional.  
 
4.4. Leadership style 
 
We found that most of the participants (27 out of 40) in our interviews were positive about the 
administrative leadership of the WCPFC and expressed their satisfaction when dealing with 
the incumbent senior officials/administrators of the WCPFC (e.g. Chairs, Directors and 
Secretary Generals). The key reason was that the leadership team treated all members equally, 





shows that sound leadership of CM encourages a participatory approach in matters such as 
decision-making, the enactment of laws, the development of policies, and encourages members 
to solve problems collectively (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). One of the participants said: 
The leaders appear to be neutral, and do not take side with their country. No complaint so far 
about them being biased etc. In addition, generally there is no complaint about WCPFC leaders 
being ineffective or biased. 
 
We also found that these incumbents were mostly from the PICs and focused more on 
establishing the relationships with and between members than enforcing the rules agreed upon 
by members. One of the interviewees put it this way: 
However, it [WCPFC] comes a long way to be where it is in terms of management  
framework and so I ‘d say it’s effective to begin with but needs to be reinforced. Have a look at 
the status of bigeye tuna for the last five years, it has been inching on over-fishing. There still 
has not been a solution…  
 
The finding suggested that leadership style plays an important role. But we argue that the 
leadership style alone was unlikely to succeed in enforcing the rules of the WCFPC, in 
particular, those of CMMS which were seen as being crucial to curbing the sharp decline in 
tuna resources.  
 
4.5. Power inequality and different powers 
 
According to Article 20 of the Convention (The Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean), 
decision-making by the WCPFC should be generally based on consensus among member 
states. However, to our observation in the interviews, power disparity between PICs and 
DWFNs who can leverage development aids in negotiations, made it difficult for decisions to 
be made on sustainable tuna management. An example was the submission made by Pacific 
Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) on the 4th November 2016 to close all fishing activities 
on the high seas pocket enclosing PIC’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The DWFNs opposed 
the proposed measures (WCPFC, 2016b). The PIC members reacted by not granting fishing 
license to DWFNs to fish in PIC’s waters according to our interviews. 
The majority (24 out of 40) of the participants from all the four memberships of WCPFC 
that we interviewed indicated that different powers among the WCPFC members were a key 
barrier to reaching consensus on CMMs. A representative of a sub-regional country 
interviewed commented: 
…. there is a big power inequality, but it cuts both ways. The smallest countries on 
earth are dealing with the most powerful, economic thugs, they use their markets, their 
aid and other instruments, they can intimidate PICs. However, another source of power 
is that these fish occur in the waters of developing countries, 90% of the catch is taken 
either in the waters of PICs or in Indonesia, Philippines or in the waters adjacent to 
those countries. That gives a very great power to the PICs. This WCPFC is about that 
balance of power on one hand, PICs with their power of ownership and right of the 
resources, and on the other hand the economic and political powers of the DWFNs. 
That’s the game. 
Prior research suggests that power imbalance and differential could be a significant force 
that affects negatively CM outcomes (Gallardo et al., 2013). It is a complex phenomenon from 
an interdisciplinary perspective (e.g. political, economic, resource affiliated, social, cultural, 
etc.). The power differential was structural in the case of the WCPFC. We found that the 





fisheries. The study by Havice and Campling (2010) pointed out that the regionalization and 
internationalization of fisheries management was diminishing PICs’ sovereignty and property 
rights and hindering their domestic capacity to regulate and control tuna fishing activities. 
DWFNs were using their economic power to exert pressure on fishing regulation at regional 
and national levels in the interest of their fleets. The power struggle and power relationship 
among different interest groups of WCPFC was eroding the potential benefit of the CM of 
WCPFC.   
 
4.6. Cultural differences 
 
From a culture perspective, the 26 member states of the WCPFC boasted a wide range of 
cultural backgrounds including the cultures of the West, the East and the South Pacific. The 
different membership groups – PIC, DWFN and REMO manifested different cultural 
orientations although intra-culture differences existed within each of the groups. We found that 
half of the participants (20 out of 40) held a view that different cultural values and norms among 
member states often negatively affected the outcomes of CM in the WCPFC. It was interesting 
to note that the cultural differences were less acknowledged by participants from DWFN and 
REMO than from the PIC group (see Table 3 for detail). Instead of capitalizing on the cultural 
diversity, the WCPFC was seen to be constantly struggling with it. One of the participants 
explained:  
Cultural differences actually hinder a lot of things, impacting on how we manage this 
resource [tuna fisheries]. You take for example, Pacific Islanders, they have to listen 
to chiefs when it comes to talking in meetings, they can’t talk even if they know the 
subject. However, there are other parties that do not possess the culture of being 
obedient; they make a lot of noise in the meetings when they talk. That sort of cultural 
thing has seeped into this management and has worked against us too. 
This remark reflected the different attitudes towards power distance which is defined as the 
degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be 
unequally shared (Hofstede, 2001). In the light of the cultural orientation theory of Hofstede 
(2001), countries that are high in power distance tend to be submissive. This was evident in the 
PICs that had high respect for chiefs, leaders and their early colonial powers (e.g. the USA, 
EU, and the UK). They viewed their leaders on the hierarchy end of society. Thus, they tended 
to keep quiet in decision-making process. In contrast, those members (e.g. Australians and New 
Zealanders) who came from a low power distance culture, freely debated issues that concerned 
them. Our interview findings also indicated another distinct cultural difference – individualism 
and collectivism (Hofstede, 2001) that may hinder the way that member states managed tuna 
resources and how the CM was enacted. For example, one of the participants told us: 
We, in the Pacific, are more communal in our approach, we love our community-based 
management. The Western world looks at things differently, they do their own things 
and do not mind others’ businesses. I think the perception that DWFNs have, will also 
affect the way we manage our resources collaboratively. They look at their own 
survivability, the economic viability, etc. I think our upbringings do have an impact on 
the way we manage our resources collaboratively.  
This finding suggested that cultural differences and the inability of appreciation of the 
differences affected adversely the collaboration and outcomes of the WCPFC. 
The overall findings of our research demonstrate that the management of migratory tuna 
resources in the WCPO is a far more complex process and should consider the contingency 





migratory tuna resources. Based on our findings from this study and the extant literature, we 
posit that for collaborative management to be effective for the WCPFC, member states should 
work on the mechanisms surrounding: equal power sharing among members, reciprocity of 
benefits and common interests, intelligence in terms of cross-cultural communication and 
understanding, strong leadership and intervention of governing body of coalition group, self-
enforcement compounded with external enforcement, and a balanced group structure and 
manageable size of coalition group. These factors are particularly important for the sustainable 
management of CPRs which involves multiple nations and cross-regional and international co-
operations.  
 
5. Contributions, Limitations and future research 
This study contributes to the extant literature on commons management and governance in 
three ways. First, extant studies on the use of CM in the international governance of CPRs  and 
research on issues of managing migratory tuna in the Pacific region are limited. This study 
addresses the knowledge gaps and provides empirical evidence to demonstrate what are the 
most prominent continency factors that may influence the outcomes of CM governance model 
in managing migratory tuna in the WCPO region. By studying the WCPFC, this research 
identified six key factors in the management of CPRs in multiple geographical areas where 
inter-country and different sovereign states are involved, Second, there is a lack of 
understanding in the literature on how the factors affect the outcomes of CM. The study sheds 
important insights on how each of the six factors played out in the institutional arrangement 
and governance of migratory tuna resources, through the analysis of the motivations and 
conducts of international actors of a large heterogeneous coalition (i.e. WCPFC). Third, the 
contingent factors of CM identified through this empirical study could be used not only to 
extend the current research in CM of CPRs but also help policy makers develop effective 
strategies for managing migratory fishing resources to sustain the economic viability and 
sustainability in the region. 
This study has taken every caution to ensure research rigorousness. However, a few 
limitations must be acknowledged. First, despite the merits of a case study, this method limits 
the generalisation of the findings given the single case design of this study. Multiple cases can 
be opted for more insightful results. Second, a quantitative study embracing more questions 
with a larger sample size should be employed to validate the findings from the qualitative 
approach. Third, more members from DWFNs and costal states could have been recruited for 
our interviews because they may have raised different issues and provided different influencing 
factors. Future research should take these limitations into considerations to design a study that 
can identify an optimal model for more effective collaborative management in migratory tuna 




Collaborative management of CPRs has been suggested to be an effective governance model 
for commons managements in the literature (e.g. Vetemaa et al., 2001; Mutimukru, 2010; 
Hauzer et al., 2013; Aura et al., 2020). This study suggests that the effectiveness is contingent 
on many factors, which may vary in different contexts and thus need be considered cautiously 
when making institutional arrangements for commons management. The findings of our study 
are insightful and instrumental for commons management researchers and policy makers in 
developing models and strategies for collaborative management. The study is particularly 
useful for CM which involves multiple stakeholders, multi-governments, and multi-national 





(i.e. cross-country and cross-cultural). Their significant differences, competing interests, and 
different economical aspirations appear often to lead them to base their decisions at the expense 
of collective objectives and collaborative institutions.  
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i Pacific island countries (PICs), commonly known as small islands developing states, have limited 
landmass (with the exception of Papua New Guinea), with few natural resources, but they control the 
largest ocean area in the world. 
ii This is the region stretching from Indonesia and the Philippines in the west, to Hawaii, Kiribati and 
French Polynesia in the east, and from the southern oceans at 55 degrees south to the waters of the 
Arctic in the north. 
 
 
 
 
